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I. Introduction
“Baseball has been the national pastime for over one hundred
1
and fifty years and enjoys a unique place in American heritage.”
Baseball is so pervasive in the national culture that it suffices to say
2
that “baseball is everybody’s business.” Through wars and disasters
alike, the game survives. It is amusement to cure the lull of a summer
3
day, and salvation in times of sorrow.



J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The
author would like to thank his family for their continued love and support, as well as
Professor James Wagstaffe for his guidance throughout the writing process.
1. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 266 (1972).
2. Id.
3. Baseball Responds to September 11 Attacks: Silenced Stadiums, NAT’L PASTTIME,
http://www.nationalpastime.com/stitches/september11.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
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Major League Baseball (“MLB”) is an organization that has
evolved over the years. What was once a game played by residents of
small farm towns across the country is now a multi-billion dollar
4
5
industry with international ties and ever-expanding exposure.
With this transformation, the needs of the game have changed.
Back in 1922, the United States Supreme Court declared baseball a
game of exhibitions that was purely a state affair, not interstate
6
commerce. Almost a century later, it is laughable to think that
baseball does not consist of interstate commerce, yet its place in the
judicial framework is still unsettled.
Currently, there is a growing discrepancy between small-market
and large-market MLB teams. In part, the first-year amateur draft
often fails to steer the most talented players to the worst teams
7
because of financial concerns surrounding signing rookies. MLB had
the opportunity to fix this problem with the newest Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). The purpose of the CBA is to
create a working environment that strikes a balance between the
8
interests of the players and owners. The changes to the new CBA
attempted to curb the spending on rookies by assigning teams
9
specified budgets for the first-year amateur draft. Although the new
CBA has made steps in the right direction, MLB should implement a
hard slotted salary structure in the future to fully transform the
amateur draft and ultimately improve professional baseball.
This Note will first give a history of antitrust law, MLB, and MLB
CBAs. It will then analyze how antitrust and labor law set the legal
framework for the first-year amateur draft, the historical problems of

4. Sports
Industry
Overview,
PLUNKETT
RESEARCH,
LTD.,
http://www.plunkettresearch.com/sports-recreation-leisure-market-research/industrystatistics (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (MLB generated $7.2 billion in revenue in 2011).
5. See generally Benjamin Goss, Taking the Ballgame Out to the World: An Analysis
of the World Baseball Classic as a Global Branding Promotional Strategy for Major League
Baseball, J. SPORTS ADMIN. AND SUPERVISION 75 (2009), available at
www.jsasonline.org/home/v1n1/articles/v1i1_goss-article.pdf.
6. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
209 (1922).
7. Peter Toms, Last Week in Bizball: Will Mandatory Slotting Hurt Small Revenue
Franchises, BIZ OF BASEBALL (Feb. 28, 2011) http://bizofbaseball.com (search
“mandatory slotting”).
8. Philip Bautista, Congress Says, “Yooou’re Out!!!” to the Antitrust Exemption of
Professional Baseball: A Discussion of the Current State of Player-Owner Collective
Bargaining and the Impact of the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
445, 456 (2000).
9. New Labor Deal Faces Major Draft Changes, BASEBALL AMERICA (Nov. 22,
2011) http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/draft/news/2011/2612639.html.
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the draft, the changes to the current CBA, and the potential
consequences of the new CBA rules. It will then propose the
implementation of a hard slotted salary as a better solution to MLB’s
current problems. Finally, this note will offer a conclusion as to the
likelihood of a hard-slotted salary system being implemented.

II. Background
A. Antitrust Law and Major League Baseball’s Exemption

With commerce in the United States expanding, Congress passed
the Sherman Act in 1890 to oppose the combination of entities that
10
could potentially harm competition. The purpose of the Sherman
Act was not to protect businesses from the working of the market, but
11
instead to protect the public from the failure of the market.
Congress sought to prevent restraints to free competition in business
and commercial transactions that restrict production, raise prices, or
otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or
12
consumers of goods and services. The Sherman Act directs itself not
against conduct that is competitive, but against conduct that unfairly
13
tends to destroy competition itself.
Although baseball has been nationally popular since its creation,
the Court held that the formation of a baseball league did not
14
constitute an attempt to monopolize as defined by the Sherman Act.
In Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, the Court stated that baseball was a business of
15
“giving exhibitions,” which were “purely state affairs.” At the time,
the teams that composed the National League were in different cities
16
spread across different states.
The teams played each other in
“public exhibitions” for money, with one of the teams often crossing a
17
state line in order to play the game. The fact that individuals on the
team crossed state lines in order to play many of their games was, in
the Court’s view, “mere incident” and did not change the character of

10. William Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI.
L. REV. 221, 221 (1956).
11. Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
12. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
13. McQuillan, 506 U.S. at 458.
14. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
209 (1922).
15. Id. at 208.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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the business. The Court held that the National League was not an
interference with commerce among the states, and thus professional
19
baseball was not subject to the antitrust laws of the Sherman Act.
Thirty years later, the Court reaffirmed the Federal Baseball
20
holding and declined to overrule its prior decision. In Toolson v.
New York Yankees, the Court held that if there were any problems in
baseball that warranted the application of antitrust laws, then it
21
The Court believed that
needed to be addressed by legislation.
Congress had the Federal Baseball decision under consideration, but
Congress’ lack of legislation was evidence that it chose not to apply
22
antitrust laws to professional baseball.
Although the Court affirmed the antitrust exemption, Toolson
emphasized the transformation of baseball’s landscape in America.
In a dissent that highlighted this transformation, Justice Burton wrote
that it was a “contradiction in terms” to say that baseball was not
engaged in interstate commerce within the breadth of the Sherman
23
Act. He believed baseball was inherently “intercity, intersectional,
24
He spotted gaps in professional baseball’s
and interstate.”
exemption, such as the Court’s failure in Federal Baseball to state that
baseball’s activities would still be exempt if the Court found it was
25
interstate commerce. Additionally, Congress had created neither an
express nor implied exemption from the Sherman Act for
26
professional baseball.
Although baseball was still exempt, the
landscape was changing.
In Flood v. Kuhn, the Court again signaled the need for Congress
27
to weigh in on professional baseball. In analyzing Federal Baseball
and Toolson, the Court agreed with the lower court that the
distinction between baseball and other professional sports that were
not subject to the exemption was “‘unrealistic,’ ‘inconsistent,’ and
28
‘illogical.’” Although the Court did not overrule the exemption, it
held that baseball was a business that was engaged in interstate

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 208–09.
Id. at 209.
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 356 (1953).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 364.
Flood v. Kahn, 407 U.S. 258, 268 n.9 (1972).
Id.
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29

commerce. Additionally, the exemption was confined to baseball
because of its “unique characteristics and needs,” and did not apply to
30
other professional sports operating interstate. While the Court did
not overrule baseball’s exemption created in Federal Baseball, it
31
highlighted the desire for Congress to act. The Court stated that the
exemption could only be overturned by legislation, but Congress’
32
“positive inaction” allowed the decision to stand for so long.
B. Congress Acts – the Curt Flood Act of 1998

Nearly eight decades after Federal Baseball, Congress addressed
33
baseball’s antitrust exemption with the Curt Flood Act of 1998. The
34
Curt Flood Act brought “the rule of antitrust law to baseball.” Its
purpose was to state that MLB players would have the same rights
35
under antitrust laws as other professional athletes.
The Act is divided into four subsections that define what conduct
36
is covered, what is excluded, and who can bring a suit under the Act.
The first subsection subjects “conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
of persons in the business of organized major league baseball directly
relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball players”
37
to antitrust laws. The second subsection limits the application to
those actions defined in subsection (a), specifically excluding
litigation involving franchise relocation, the minor leagues, and “any
38
organized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft.”
The third subsection further limits standing to sue under antitrust
laws to current or former major league baseball players, but
specifically excludes these players from bringing suit regarding a
39
violation of the first-year player draft. Overall, the Curt Flood Act
was specifically targeted at major league baseball players and created
an exemption for the first year amateur draft.

29. Id. at 282.
30. Id. at 282–83.
31. Id. at 283–84.
32. Id.
33. 15 U.S.C.S. § 26b (1998).
34. Nathaniel Grow, Reevaluating the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 87 NEB. L. REV. 747,
748 (2009) (citing Reynolds Holding, Do Baseball Bigwigs Deserve Special Treatment?
Why, exactly, should those who already have it easy be further protected by a monopoly?,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 22, 1998, at SC-5).
35. 15 U.S.C.S. § 26b(a) (1998).
36. § 26b.
37. § 26b(a).
38. § 26b(b)(1).
39. § 26b(c).
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C. The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Development and Present
State in Professional Baseball

Baseball’s antitrust exemption status created an imbalance of
40
bargaining power between labor and management.
Lacking the
ability to address issues under the antitrust laws, many commentators
urged the use of “concerted activity and collective bargaining as a
41
countervailing force to the power of the owners.” In response to the
threat of unionization in 1946, the owners created a representation
plan that limited representation to providing a means for
42
communicating players’ suggestions and complaints. In 1954, the
players formed the Major League Baseball Players’ Association
(“MLBPA”), which operated as a “conduit of information,” but
43
functioned as neither a union nor a collective bargaining unit. The
player representatives were given the opportunity to air their
grievances, but were only able to wait and accept whatever action the
44
club owners decided to take.
Gradually, the MLBPA transformed from “its earlier status as an
45
information exchange group to a bona fide labor organization.”
After Marvin Miller was named as the executive director of the
Association in 1966, the owners feared and despised Miller because
he “travelled from camp to camp spreading the gospel of economic
46
progress through unity.” Concerted union activity occurred in 1969
when players boycotted spring training as a result of the inability of
players and management to reach an agreement on the funding of the
47
players’ pension plan.
Later that year, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)
48
indirectly approved the organization’s collective bargaining status.
The NLRB is an independent federal agency vested with the power to
safeguard employees’ rights to organize and to prevent unfair labor
40. Bautista, supra note 8, at 454 (citing Erwin Kranskow & Herman Levy,
Unionization and Professional Sports, 51 GEO. L.J. 749, 758 (1963)).
41. Robert McCormick, Baseball’s Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective
Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1150 (1982).
42. Id. at 1151.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1152.
46. Jerry Crasnick, LICENSE TO DEAL: A SEASON ON THE RUN WITH A MAVERICK
BASEBALL AGENT 132–33, (Rodale, 2005).
47. McCormick, supra note 41, at 1152.
48. Id.
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practices committed by private sector employers and unions.
In
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Association of
50
National Baseball League Umpires,
the NLRB held that
professional baseball was an industry “in or affecting interstate
commerce” and thus subject to the protections and requirements of
51
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The NLRA provides
that employees have a “right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
52
Additionally, it requires labor and
mutual aid or protection.”
management to bargain in good faith over terms and conditions of
53
employment.
In 1972, the Players’ Association confronted the owners in the
first test of the organization’s strength and the owners’ resolve, and
54
players undertook the first industry-wide strike. In 1973, the players
and owners entered into a new CBA that provided an arbitration
system that allowed players to submit salary disputes for arbitration
55
by an impartial judge. This agreement crippled the reserve clause,
which allowed owners to renew the expired contract of a player for
56
one year in the event that a new contract would not be reached.
In order to curb the momentum the players gained with the CBA
in 1973, the owners aggressively entered the 1976 negotiations and
struck a deal which bound players to their respective teams for six
57
years. These negotiations resulted in a seventeen-day lockout, and
foreshadowed the continuous conflict over player movement and
58
rapidly escalating salaries.
Following the 1976 agreement, salaries rose sharply, and owners
once again aggressively entered the 1981 negotiations with the
59
intention of curbing salary growth.
The owners wanted a
compensatory system with a minimum and maximum salary for

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

What We Do, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
Am. League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
Id.
29 U.S.C. §157 (2006).
McCormick, supra note 41, at 1152–53.
Id. at 1153.
Bautista, supra note 8, at 457.
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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players with fewer than six years in the league, but the MLBPA
viewed these provisions as a conspiracy against player freedom of
60
movement.
Both the owners and players maintained hard-line
stances, and it was not until one and one-half years and two player
61
The agreement
strikes later that they agreed on a new CBA.
featured a free agent system that compensated teams that were losing
62
players via free agency while allowing player mobility.
Player salaries continued to rise, so the owners entered the 1985
63
negotiations intending to slow the escalating rate of salary growth.
64
The owners proposed a salary cap, but the players opposed it and
went on strike for two days, forcing the owners to take the salary cap
65
off the negotiating table. Both sides eventually agreed to increase
the minimum salary in exchange for limits on players’ opportunities
66
for salary arbitration.
Following this 1985 agreement, the owners became frustrated
67
with their inability to curb the growth of escalating player salaries.
They took matters into their own hands and instituted an illegal
policy concerning free agents—collusion—that involved the
68
concerted action of the owners to prevent instances of free agency.
The owners agreed among themselves to offer no free agent
contracts, which was evident in the fact that after the 1985 season,
fifty-seven free agent players out of sixty-two resigned with their
original teams for contracts less than their original teams had
69
offered. The players filed a grievance, and arbitrators found in their
favor, stating that the owners violated the 1985 CBA and had to pay
70
the players $280 million in damages.
These collusive tactics
punctuated the owners’ desire for a salary cap and their willingness to
negotiate in bad faith to achieve their goals.

60. Id. at 458–59.
61. Id. at 459.
62. Id. at 460.
63. Id.
64. Thomas Picher, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Repealed: An Analysis of the
Effect on Salary Cap and Salary Taxation Provisions, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 37
(1997) (“Salary cap provisions in professional sports establish maximum team salaries
based on a predetermined percentage of the defined gross revenues of the league.”).
65. Bautista, supra note 8, at 461.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 460.
68. Thomas Hopkins, Arbitration: A Major league Effect on Players’ Salaries, 2
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 301, 314 (1992).
69. Bautista, supra note 8, at 461.
70. Id. at 461–62.
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In negotiating the 1990 CBA, the owners continued their efforts
71
to stem the ever-increasing player salaries. The owners wanted to
72
73
implement a new salary system based on a revenue-sharing plan,
74
but the players viewed this as a form of a salary cap and rejected it.
Following a month-long lockout, the owners removed the salary cap
from the negotiating table, and the two sides agreed to the players’
liberalized salary arbitration proposition, as well as the owners’ terms
75
regarding minimum salaries.
Although the 1990 agreement was not set to expire for four years,
it contained a provision that allowed either side to reopen
76
negotiations after only three years.
In December of 1992, the
77
owners voted to reopen negotiations on the CBA with the players to
discuss the issues of free agency, salary arbitration, and a minimum
78
salary.
After reaching an impasse following two years of
negotiations, the players instituted a strike towards the end of the
79
1994 season, and the owners cancelled the remainder of the season.
The dispute centered on the owners’ demand to create cost control by
80
putting a limit on player payrolls.
The strike lasted over two
hundred days and carried through most of spring training the
81
following year. It ended just before the start of the 1995 season
when the NLRB sought an injunction against the owners, allowing
82
the 1995 and 1996 seasons to be played under the old CBA.

71. Id. at 462.
72. Murray Chass, Chill of Labor Impasse Threatens Baseball’s Spring, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1990, at A26.
73. David Jacobson, MLB’s Revenue Sharing Formula, CBSNEWS.COM, July 14,
2008, http://www.bnet.com/article/mlbs-revenue-sharing-formula/210897 (Revenue sharing
takes money away from high-earning teams money and gives it to low-earning teams in an
attempt to lessen the difference in the amount of money the richest teams can spend in
comparison to the poorest teams.).
74. Murray Chass, Negotiators Exchange Outlooks on Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1990, at 2.
75. Murray Chass, Baseball’s Labor Dispute Settled with Compromise on Arbitration,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1990, at 2.
76. Id. at 1.
77. Murray Chass, Baseball Owners Vote to Reopen Labor Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1992, at 1.
78. Bautista, supra note 8, at 463.
79. Murray Chass, No Runs, No Hits, No Errors: Baseball Goes on Strike, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at B9.
80. Id.
81. Ryan Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective Bargaining Agreements
in Professional Sports and their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 267, 271
(2008).
82. Id.
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In 1996, the players and owners reached an agreement with a few
changes. The agreement included a luxury tax that required the
teams with the five highest payrolls to pay a 35 percent tax on the
83
amount by which their payrolls exceed the threshold amount. It also
implemented a revenue-sharing plan that transferred 22 percent of
84
the thirteen wealthiest clubs’ local revenues to the other clubs.
Finally, the players and owners agreed jointly to petition Congress to
85
eliminate baseball’s antitrust exemption, which ultimately resulted in
the Curt Flood Act.
In 2003, the CBA maintained many of the provisions of the 1997
86
agreement.
Under the agreement, a player could achieve free
agency if he had “(1) fulfilled his current contract; (2) completed at
least six years of major league service; and (3) not executed a contract
87
for the next succeeding season.” In negotiating the agreements in
both 1997 and 2003, there was no discussion of a salary cap, so the
negotiations went smoothly.
88
The previous CBA went into effect in 2007. The discussions
were pragmatic, workmanlike, and conducted with a mutual attempt
89
to reach an agreement.
Among other things, it contained a
90
revamped draft for amateur players. Specifically, it provided clubs
that failed to sign their first or second round pick with the same pick
91
in the subsequent year’s draft as compensation. Clubs that were
unable to sign their third round pick received a sandwich pick
92
between the third and fourth rounds in the subsequent year’s draft.
The current CBA was agreed to on November 22, 2011, and
93
unanimously ratified by the owners on December 15, 2011.
It
continued the peaceful trend of negotiations and ensured MLB of two

83. Daniel Glazer, Can’t Anybody Here Run this Game? The Past, Present, and
Future of Major League Baseball, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 339, 364 (1999).
84. Id. at 365.
85. Id.
86. Dryer, supra note 81, at 271.
87. Id.
88. Barry Bloom, MLB, Union Announce New Labor Deal, MLB (Oct. 25, 2006)
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20061024&content_id=1722211&fext=.jsp&c_id
=mlb.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Press Release, MLB, Clubs Unanimously Ratify New Collective Bargaining
Agreement (Dec. 15, 2011, 5:44 PM) http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111215&
content_id=26175840& vkey=pr_mlb&c_id=mlb.

2012]

DRAFTING A SOLUTION
94

decades without a labor stoppage.
95
expire on December 1, 2016.

437

It is for a five-year term and will

III. Analysis
MLB is an imperfect league. It faces continuous challenges that
force it to recognize problems and implement solutions. The new
CBA was a way for both the players and the owners to address their
concerns and implement changes to the league.
A. The Antitrust Exemption and Labor Law

MLB is subject to NLRA labor laws because of its exemption
from antitrust law. The NLRA sets a low standard of behavior by
which the owners must abide. The labor laws under the NLRA are
not nearly as restrictive as antitrust laws, and only require that “labor
and management bargain in good faith over terms and conditions of
96
employment.”
Under the NLRA, cases are brought before the
97
NLRB, not a court of law. Additionally, if players wish to protest
unfair labor practices by the owners, they can only strike if it is lawful,
98
with the issue determined by the NLRB.
Unlike the labor laws of the NLRA, the Sherman Act provides a
remedy against “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several
99
States.” The Sherman Act prohibits all contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, but the Supreme Court interprets
the Sherman Act only to bar agreements that unreasonably restrain
100
trade. A plaintiff in an antitrust case must establish that a contract,
combination, or conspiracy exists, and that it unreasonably restrains
101
trade.

94. Ben Nicholson-Smith, CBA Details: Luxury Tax, Draft, HGH, Replay, MLB
TRADE RUMORS (Nov. 22, 2011 2:15 PM) http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/ 2011/11/cbadetails-luxury-tax-draft-.html.
95. Press Release, MLB, MLBPA Reach New Five-Year Labor Agreement,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111122&content_id=26025138&vkey=pr_mlb
&c_id=mlb.
96. McCormick, supra note 41, at 1152–53.
97. Employee Rights, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/ rights-we-protect/employee-rights
(last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
98. Id.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
100. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
101. James McKeown, Antitrust Developments in Professional Sports: to the Single
Entity and Beyond, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 363, 365 (2009).
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Antitrust laws hold leagues to a higher standard than labor laws.
Under labor laws, MLB must only negotiate in good faith. The
antitrust exemption for the first-year amateur draft allows MLB
owners to take actions that constitute trade restraints, so long as they
are done in good faith. This severely limits the challenges that the
MLBPA can bring in court, and limits the relief that the MLBPA can
seek. Based on this unfair bargaining position, the owners have been
able to take advantage of the first-year amateur draft and overpay
rookies.
When the Court created baseball’s antitrust exemption in Federal
Baseball, it put professional baseball players at a severe negotiating
disadvantage. Although subsequent Supreme Court cases questioned
this exemption, it was not until the Curt Flood Act that Congress
102
made a concerted effort to remove baseball’s antitrust exemption.
As noted above, the Curt Flood Act was full of numerous exemptions
103
Specifically, the Act does not
and applied only to MLB players.
remove the exemption from “any organized professional baseball
104
amateur or first-year player draft.” To bring a suit challenging the
legality of the amateur draft, a player would need to prove that the
105
draft was a tool by which the owners did not bargain in good faith.
This has given the owners a bargaining advantage when it comes to
changing the draft during CBA negotiations.
B. Historical Imbalances in Signing Draft Picks

Historically, one of MLB’s biggest problems has been the
106
It has not served the
structure of the first-year amateur draft.
purpose of a well functioning “reverse order draft,” which is supposed
to allow the worst MLB franchises to acquire the best amateur
107
Too often, the draft failed to steer the most talented
talent.
108
amateur players to the clubs with the poorest on-field performance.
Before the implementation of the current CBA, prior to each
draft, MLB would send a “suggested slotting” for each selection, but

102. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (1998).
103. § 26b.
104. § 26b(b)(1).
105. McCormick, supra note 41, at 1152–53.
106. Toms, supra note 7.
107. Id.
108. Peter Toms, Last Week in Bizball: Reforming the Amateur Draft Update, THE BIZ
OF BASEBALL (Oct. 19, 2009) http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=3651:lwib-updates-on-reforming-the-amatuer-draft-and-revenuesharing &catid=67:pete-toms&Itemid=155.
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109

they were only suggestions.
The draft consisted of a “stupid
110
informal slotting system that nobody pa[id] attention to anyway.”
Some teams followed the suggestions, but others did not and sought
permission from the Commissioner’s office to pay higher than the slot
111
allotment.
The most notable exemptions to these suggestions were special
players who would often drop because of “signability concerns and
112
the threat that they’ll hold out for as long as it takes.”
Smaller
teams routinely passed on superior talent and allowed the best
players to slip to better teams because they lacked the money to sign
113
For example, in 2001, the sixty-fourth
these “premium” players.
and sixty-fifth picks of the draft received $625,000 and $620,000
signing bonuses respectively, but the sixty-sixth pick received a $2
114
The sixty-sixth pick was a potential firstmillion signing bonus.
round pick, but fell almost thirty slots because teams were concerned
115
with their ability to sign him at such a high asking price.
116
A more recent example is Rick Porcello. Porcello was a highly
rated pitcher, considered by some to be the best pitcher in the 2007
117
draft, but he was not drafted until the twenty-seventh pick overall.
If not for being considered one of the toughest players to sign in the
entire draft, he would have been drafted much higher, potentially
118
second overall by Kansas City.
Unlike other major professional sports athletes, a drafted baseball
player has the option of either signing with the team that drafted him
or returning to school. Even after being drafted, high school players
119
may attend college if they do not sign with a MLB team. Often, the
player forces the team to pay a high signing bonus at the threat of
109. Jonathan Mayo, Slotting System Could Improve Draft, MLB (Dec. 16, 2009)
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20091215&content_id=7815624&vkey=news_ml
b&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb.
110. Jayson Stark, Sorry, But this Slot Machine is Broken, ESPN (June 5, 2009) http://
sports.espn.go.com/mlb/draft2009/columns/story?columnist=stark_jayson&id=4227655.
111. Id.
112. Crasnick, supra note 46, at 252.
113. Id. at 250.
114. Id. at 252.
115. Id.
116. Buster Olney, Fixing the MLB Draft, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2010) http://insider.
espn.go.com /mlb/blog/_/name/olney_buster/id/4858885.
117. Danny Knobler, Tigers Take Rick Porcello in Draft, MLIVE (June 7, 2007) http://
blog. mlive.com/tigersinsider/2007/06/tigers_take_rick_porcllo_in_dr.html.
118. Id.
119. First-Year Player Draft: Official Rules, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/
rules.jsp (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
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returning to school and the team wasting a draft pick. MLB features
unique characteristics in its draft that differentiate it from other major
professional sports. Largely, the MLB first-year amateur draft has up
120
to fifty rounds. This is in contrast to the National Football League
121
(“NFL”), which has only seven rounds, and the National Basketball
122
League (“NBA”), which consists of only two rounds. Not only do
NFL and NBA teams have to invest money in fewer picks, it also
means that the MLB draft creates a much larger pool from which
stars can emerge. For example, Albert Pujols, a guaranteed first123
ballot Hall of Famer, was drafted in the thirteenth round. Similarly,
Roy Oswalt, a three-time All-Star pitcher with a 159-93 win-loss
124
125
career record, was drafted in the twenty-third round. The breadth
of the MLB draft also gives each team more players to which it must
devote time and resources. With such a high number of rounds and
players drafted, many smaller market teams have passed on players
with signability issues in an attempt to focus on players they could
sign for a lower amount.
Additionally, there was a movement among veteran players to
curtail the escalating compensation being awarded rookies and
126
Veteran players were being
apportion those savings to veterans.
met with diminished demand for their services in the free agent
market in terms of both contract length and value, while competition
127
amongst clubs in the first-year amateur draft sharply increased.
Veterans believed that the money should go to big league players, not
to rookies “who are still hanging out at the student union after

120. First Year Player Draft: FAQ, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/faq.jsp (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012).
121. News: NFL draft’s first round moves to Thursday night for 2010, NAT’L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/news/story?confirm=true&id=09000d5d8116
faa2&template=without-video-with-comments (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
122. Evolution of the Draft and Lottery, NAT’L BASKETBALL ASSOC., http://www.nba.
com/history/draft_evolution.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
123. Jerry Crasnick, Later Round Draft Picks Who’ve Developed Rather Nicely, ESPN
(June 4, 2008) http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=crasnick_jerry&id=
3423890.
124. Baseballreference.com Profile: Roy Oswalt, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://
www.baseball-reference.com/players/o/oswalro01.shtml. (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
125. Crasnick, supra note 112.
126. Pete Toms, Last Week in Bizball: Time for the MLBPA to Embrace the Salary
Cap?, THE BIZ OF BASEBALL, (Feb. 1, 2010), http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=4049:lwib-salary-cap-in-mlb-reforming-the-draftbiz-tidbits&catid=67:petetoms& Itemid=155.
127. Id.
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128

games.”
A recent example is that of Steven Strasburg, the first
129
In addition to the buzz
overall pick in the 2010 amateur draft.
created by his reported demands pre-draft, he ended up with a
130
contract worth $15 million. For many veteran players, “giving that
much money to a player who had yet to log a single professional
131
inning was objectionable.” Veteran players did not want such large
amounts of money going to “kids” who have never played a MLB
132
game.
C. Spending Limits in the Current CBA

MLB’s number one priority in negotiations over the new CBA
133
Prior to the negotiations, MLB
was the first-year amateur draft.
created a committee to “identify existing problems and find solutions
134
for them.” The premise that guided these committee meetings was
that the first-year amateur draft was the best and easiest manner by
135
which baseball could address the widening financial disparities. The
hope is that under the new system players will get drafted when they
136
should, based on their talent rather than their signability.
137
The new CBA added heavy restrictions on draft spending. Each
club has a spending limit based on when it is scheduled to make its
138
first ten selections. The team with the first pick will have a limit of
$11.5 million, and the team selecting last will have a limit of $4.5
139
million. Bonuses after the tenth round don’t count against the limit,
140
unless the bonus exceeds $100,000.
There are strict penalties to enforce the spending limits and
reduce draft spending. Teams that spend more than 5 percent over-

128. Stark, supra note 110.
129. Mayo, supra note 109.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Stark, supra note 110.
133. Jayson Stark, How the New CBA Changes Baseball, ESPN (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/mlb/story /_/id/7270203/baseball-new-labor-deal-truly-historic-one.
134. Mayo, supra note 109.
135. Olney, supra note 116.
136. Jonathan Mayo, Signing-bonus Constraints to impact Draft, MLB (Dec. 1, 2011,
1:49PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111201&content_id=26066708&vkey
=news_mlb&c_id=mlb.
137. Nicholson-Smith, supra note 94.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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141

slot on the draft will face a 75 percent tax. Teams that go over slot
by five to ten percent face a 75 percent tax and the loss of a first
142
round draft pick. Teams that go over slot by ten to fifteen percent
face a 100 percent tax and the loss of a first and second round draft
143
Teams that exceed slot by 15 percent or more face a 100
pick.
percent tax and the loss of first round draft picks in the next two
144
drafts.
Proceeds from the tax will go to clubs that did not over145
spend, and forfeited draft picks will be distributed via a lottery.
Additionally, the CBA contains a competitive balance lottery to
146
give low-revenue teams additional draft picks. The ten clubs with
the lowest revenues and the ten clubs in the smallest markets are
eligible to win one of six draft choices that will be added after the first
round, with the teams’ chances of winning the lottery depending on
147
their winning percentage in the previous season. The teams that do
not win additional picks and all other teams that qualify under the
revenue sharing plan will be eligible for a second lottery for six more
148
Unlike other draft picks, teams can
picks after the second round.
149
MLB hopes that these new rules will curb
trade these picks.
spending on the first-year draft and restore the competitive balance.
D. Consequences of the New CBA

Although there has not been a draft since the current CBA’s
implementation, there has been negative reaction to the new amateur
150
spending limits. Some believe the new rules will continue to keep
small-market teams down and have an adverse effect on teams trying
151
to build through the minor leagues.
They believe that building
through the draft will continue to be the most cost-effective way to

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Phil Rogers, Rebuilding Teams Put up Happy Front About CBA, CHI. TRIB.
(Nov. 26, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-11-26/sports/sc-spt-1127-notesrogers-baseball--20111127_1_cba-low-revenue-teams-draft.
151. Id.
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construct a team, but smart teams will now have a harder time using
152
their aggressiveness to their advantage.
There is also a belief that the new rules concerning the first-year
153
player draft will have an impact on prep athletes. Some believe that
these restrictions are likely to negatively impact the number of high
154
school players that ultimately choose pro baseball.
High school
draftees will not be able to hold out for as much bonus money as in
past years, so they will likely head to college rather than starting their
155
professional careers. One scouting director believes that it will take
more money to sign the top talents, leaving less money for the later
156
draft picks in the first ten rounds. Little is known at this point, but
there is not much optimism that the new rules will balance the
spending power in MLB.

IV. Proposal: Implementing a Hard-Slotted Salary System
Although the limits of the new CBA are a step in the right
direction, this note proposes that MLB go further in the next CBA
and implement a hard-slotted system for the first-year amateur
157
In drafting the new CBA, the league may have sought a
draft.
system of hard-slotting, but eventually found traction on a
158
compromise of an overall draft tax for exceeding the limits. In the
world of labor compromise, the union’s willingness to limit draft
expenditures might as well have been a trade-off for revamping the
159
draft-pick compensation system for free agents. The problem is that
160
the new spending limits won’t prohibit over-slot spending.
A hard-slotting system is required to level the playing field.
Slotting refers to “the bonus a player gets, or should get, dependent

152. Joe Lemire, New Rules on Draft Spending Will Harm Both Players and Teams,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 22, 2011), sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/joe_lemire/
11/22/cba.draft.changes/index.html.
153. Jason Churchill, New Draft Rules Could Impact Prep Prospects, ESPN (Dec. 08,
2011),
http://espn.go.com/blog/high-school/baseball/post/_/id/887/new-draft-rules-couldimpact-prep-prospects.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Sean Forman, What Would be the Effect of Hard Slotting in the MLB Draft?,
BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.baseball-reference.com/blog/
archives/7841.
158. Churchill, supra note 153.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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161

on when he’s taken in the draft.” A player receives a set amount
based on the overall number of the pick where he is selected, similar
162
to the hard slotting salary structure of the NBA. Under the NBA’s
CBA, each rookie scale contract between a team and first round pick
covers a two-year period, with team options for both the third and
163
fourth seasons. Each rookie contract must be at least 80 percent of
the applicable rookie scale amount in current base compensation, but
the total of salary and bonuses cannot exceed 120 percent of the
164
applicable rookie scale amount.
A hard slotted draft salary structure would completely remove the
imbalance in drafting. Under the current CBA, the top picks can
demand more money from the pool, leaving teams with little room to
stay within the limits of the first ten rounds. A slotted salary structure
would tell amateurs what to expect specifically based on where they
are selected. Instead of giving a team limits based on the first ten
rounds, it would place a limit on each individual pick. Placing a hard
structure on each individual pick would moderate overspending on
draft picks and curb the outrageous demands of young players who
165
believe they deserve more than they are worth. This would benefit
the small-market teams who would no longer have to pass on top
prospects demanding an exorbitant signing bonus.
With the new spending limits, there is concern that more
prospects will attend college instead of signing with a MLB team.
Ultimately, this would benefit MLB because more players would
enter the draft with experience and maturity. It would give teams a
better sense of the quality of a player and help justify drafting him
with a top pick. Although some players might still decide to pursue
other sports, in the end, the players who want to play, who have a
166
passion to pursue a Major League career, will sign. When they’re
11 and 12, they do not say, ‘I want to grow up to be a Major League
167
Baseball player, but only for a large bonus.”

161. Mayo, supra note 109.
162. Id.
163. National Basketball League Collective Bargaining Agreement, NAT’L
BASKETBALL ASS’N (2005), available at www.newballpark. org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/11/NBA-CBA2005.pdf, at 218.
164. Id. at 220.
165. Mayo, supra note 109.
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V. Conclusion
Disparities among salaries in baseball created a need for action.
Over the years, attempts to implement a salary cap have failed,
culminating in the worst work stoppage in baseball history in 1994. In
December 2011, MLB implemented a new CBA with spending limits
on the first-year amateur draft. The spending limits are a step in the
right direction, but they do not fully solve MLB’s problems.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that such a structure will be implemented
in the next CBA. The new spending limits were a contentious point
168
in negotiations and reportedly delayed the signing of the new CBA.
Constraints on a free market often come with resistance, and that is
no different in the MLB’s CBA negotiations. Although future CBAs
may not adopt a hard slotted salary system any time soon, it would
even the playing field in baseball, and give the small-market teams a
competitive chance.

168. Id.

